Motherhood Wage Discrimination, Evidences from Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) 1998-2017, South Korea by Choi, Seulki & Mingean Park
KDI SCHOOL 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
KDI SCHOOL WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Motherhood Wage Discrimination, Evidences 
from Korean Labor and Income Panel Study 
(KLIPS) 1998-2017, South Korea
Seulki Choi
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
Mingean Park
KDI School of Public Policy and Management
December, 2019
Working Paper  19-16
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
KDI School of Public Policy and Management Working Paper Series Index:
http://www.kdischool.ac.kr/new/eng/faculty/working.jsp
The Social Science Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3507424
* We are grateful to the KDI School of Public Policy and Management for providing financial support.
1Motherhood Wage Discrimination, Evidences from Korean Labor and
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Abstract
This study uses the KLIPS data between 1998 to 2017 to examine whether wage 
discrimination between mothers and non-mothers exists in the South Korea labor market. We 
compare the amount of wage gap from OLS model to a variety of Fixed effect models which 
have different types of productivity measures. The results show that mothers are 
discriminated against in the labor market. Interestingly, the amount of discrimination is 
bigger for highly-educated women than less-educated women. Especially the semi-
professional workers who have the educational attainment level at college degree or higher
are the most serious victim of the motherhood wage discrimination.
Keywords: Gender Wage Gap, Motherhood Wage Discrimination, Motherhood Wage 
Penalty 
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2Ⅰ. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to find out whether there is motherhood wage 
discrimination among women in South Korea. It has specialties in two things. First, it 
analyzes the wage differentials between mothers and non-mothers. Secondly, it focuses on 
wage discrimination.
Women in the labor market have been discriminated against men. The main reason is 
that women are traditionally responsible for childbirth and child rearing. Fortunately, the 
gender wage gap looks being diminishing. At the same time, with more economic activity for 
women than in the past, it is no longer strange for women to have a job at least among young 
generation nowadays.
In South Korea, the female labor force participation rate is increasing. The proportion
of women in the economically active population increased from 27.92% in 1960 to 50.8% in 
2015 (World Bank, 2018). At the same time, the wage gap between men and women is 
decreasing though the wage gap is still the highest among OECD countries. According to the 
Korea Women’s Development Institute’s report (2018), which analyzed the supplementary 
survey of economically active population survey by the National Statistical Office and the 
survey on labor status by employment type by the Ministry of Employment and Labor, the 
monthly wage gap between women to men was improved from 42.1% in 2010 to 36.8% in 
2017. 
Does it mean that a person who is responsible for childbearing and child-rearing are 
less suffering from discrimination comparing to the past? To give a positive answer, it is not 
good enough to check the wage gap between men and women. There is a possibility that the 
volume of discrimination is not changed as much but it happens at the different boundary –
3mothers vs. non-mothers. The gender gap approach may underestimate the difficulty of 
women who is suffering from the burden of child-bearing and rearing. We need to see the 
wage gap between mothers and non-mothers within women too. If motherhood wage 
discrimination occurs within women, the decreasing wage differential by gender could not 
mean that the discrimination is decreasing.
Not all the wage gap comes from discrimination. Discrimination happens when there 
is wage differential even though the productivity is the same. In other words, the wage 
differential which cannot be explained by productivity differential is called discrimination. 
Is there wage discrimination by motherhood in South Korea? If then, which group is the most 
vulnerable to the discrimination? They will be the research question of this paper.
Ⅱ. Related Literature
Reflecting the fact that only women can give a birth, the wage gap due to 
motherhood among women is called motherhood wage penalty which has a negative meaning. 
But not all the wage penalty is discrimination. Discrimination is said to occur when the same 
person is disadvantaged because of a group identity that does not directly affect productivity, 
rather than a difference in productivity (Heckman 1998). Motherhood wage discrimination 
occurs when a mother earns a lower wage than a non-mothers even with the same 
productivity.
Motherhood wage discrimination has been reported in many countries. Waldfogel 
(1997) used the 1968-1988 NLSY to find that motherhood wage gap tended to increase with 
education levels. 1982-1993 Using NLSY, Budig and England (2001) studied the effects of 
skilled / unskilled workers, years of education and occupational hierarchies. They argue that 
4there is no clear evidence that more skilled or dedicated women experience a wider wage gap.
They reported that women employed on a full-time basis have a bigger wage gap. Anderson 
et al. Use the 1968-1988 NLSYW data. (2002) analyzed wage gaps by education level. They 
reported that: 1) Less-educated workers (except high school diplomas) experience a 
minimum wage gap because of their low human capital, but the amount of human capital is 
not as important as other high-wage jobs. 2) Highly skilled workers (college graduates) are 
experiencing the largest wage gap. 3) High school graduates fall in the middle of these two 
groups. Anderson et al. (2003) found that high school dropouts suffer from wage gaps only 
when the child is very young and do not last as the child grows up. Choi (2011) also found 
that in the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data, there are motherhood 
wage discrimination between management professionals and office workers, but most of 
them can be explained by productivity differences such as career breaks. On the other hand, 
manual workers are the main victim of discrimination. Especially simple manual workers are 
suffering from the biggest size of discrimination in the United States. 
Motherhood wage penalties are reported in the US as well as in many other countries.
Aisenbrey, Evertsson & Grunow (2009) found that motherhood penalties were important in 
Germany and Sweden, and that the impact of motherhood wage penalty is important even in 
Sweden's “female friendly” case. Boye, Halldén & Magnusson (2017) found that the gender 
wage gap in Sweden narrowed in the 1970s, but stagnated since the 1980s. Cooke (2014) 
found that parental punishment and insurance premiums were reflected in relative 
socioeconomic conditions by comparing the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
Okoshi et al (2016) found the penalties and premiums of parents of Japanese surgeons. Mu & 
Xie (2016) examined the causal effects of fertility on parents in China and found that 
motherhood penalty is not supported for one child policy. In South Korea, Ihm’s study (2010) 
5reported that wages for women with children under 6 years were reduced by 2%, and women 
with children between 6 and 18 years of age experienced a drop in wages of about 8%.
Wage discrimination due to motherhood has other characteristics within women’s 
groups. Unlike non-mothers, mothers will have difficulty achieving their full productivity 
potential. Even with the same amount of human capital, mothers can be less productive by 
preferring maternity-friendly jobs or jobs that require less work effort (Becker, 1985; Budig 
and England, 2001). Anderson et al. (2003) found that the wage gap narrows as the youngest 
child grows, and that the wage gap for women with children aged 0-2 is much larger than the 
wage gap for mothers with children. These results show that compensation differentials and 
work efforts can affect the amount of wages. Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) investigated 
motherhood wage discrimination through laboratory experiments and audit studies in the 
United States. In laboratory experiments, they kept the characteristics of potential job 
applicants constant, changed their motherhood only, and asked a fictitious employer to 
evaluate them. As a result, employers regarded mothers as less competitive and found that 
they offered wages that were 7.9% lower than those of general workers.
III. Data and Methodology
We used the 1998-2017 survey of the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), 
a well-represented source of the Korean labor market at individual level. The KLIPS has been 
conducting an annual survey since its 1998 survey. The data used were limited to wage 
workers reflecting the characteristics of the current labor market, excluding military, self-
employed and family businesses. The analytical sample is further limited to the birth cohort 
from 1960. In order to use the panel fixed-effects model that can control unobserved 
6heterogeneity, the respondents who surveyed at least twice were used in the analysis, and the 
respondents who surveyed only once were deleted. As a result, the sample of analysis used
26,849 observations from 4,637 women in the study.
Log Monthly Wageit = αi + β1 (Number of Children)it
+ β2 (Demographic Variables)it
                     + β3 (Measures of Human Capital) it
+ β4 (Measures of Work Effort)it
+ β5 (Measures of Compensating Differentials)it
                   + μi + vt + wit
where i indexes individual women and t indexes time (1998~2017)
μ is the individual component of error, 
v is the timewise component of error, and 
w is the random error.
We will use a panel fixed-effects regression model in this study. Using fixed-effects 
has the advantage of controlling individual characteristics which cannot be observed directly 
but stable for its lifetime. The fixed effect could absorb the unobserved heterogeneity.
It is assumed that motherhood affects women’s wages, but the causality may be 
spurious. External variables can affect childbirth and wages at the same time. Examples of 
this include physical strength, health and cognitive abilities, or personal preferences for life 
trajectory. If a woman’s academic ability is high, she knows that the opportunity costs are 
relatively high, so she is more likely to pursue a career-oriented life and delay having a family. 
Knowing that her health is poor and her opportunity costs are relatively low, she is more 
likely to have a child and may spend less effort on her career. If women tend to build a family 
when they are young, this can increase the number of female children and reduce their 
income. On the contrary, if she tends to be professionally successful, she will earn more 
money and have fewer or no children. Previous studies solved this problem using fixed-effect 
7models (Waldfogel 1997, Budig and England 2001, Anderson et al. 2002, Glauber 2007). 
Many other heterogeneities are not observable or difficult to measure. However, if such a 
characteristic can be assumed to be preset or constant for at least the working period, then it 
can be eliminated by adding the fixed effects. So this study also prefers a fixed-effects model 
than the OLS model.
The effect of the number of children on wages can be identified by counting the 
number of children variable. Considering that the influence of the number of children may 
not be linear, we used a set of dummies that shows one child and two or more children 
comparing to having no child.
If the coefficients of child dummies are negative in the fixed effect model, it means 
that there is motherhood wage penalty. To capture the volume of discrimination, we need to 
add productivity variables in the model. If coefficients of having a child are significant even 
after the variables related to productivity are controlled, this can be interpreted as 
discrimination beyond the differences in productivity.
Productivity variables consisted of three parts. The first is the size of the human 
capital. Human capital is measured by the level of educational attainment and years of job 
experiences. The level of educational attainment is simplified into a dummy – whether the 
respondent has high school diploma or less / college degree or higher. Years of job 
experiences are measured into two different ways – tenure and total job experiences as a 
wage worker throughout her life. Each squared term is added, considering that the career 
impact on wages is not linear.
Women may have less effort at work because of parenting and household work, even 
if they have the same productivity potentials. As a result, it is possible to choose a workplace 
8with weak labor intensity. We expect to capture the effect by adding working hour. The 
working hour variable is constructed into three set of dummies - less than 36 hours, 36~52 
hours and more than 52 hours per week.
Some women prefer a child friendly working environment and may accept the less 
paid job offer for the preferred environment for parenting. It is called compensating 
differential. The workplace environment is difficult to measure directly. Instead we add the 
dummy for having a child under age 5.
Monthly Wages was used as a dependent variable and adjusted based on 2017 prices. 
The top and bottom 1% was considered an outlier and excluded. In addition, age and marital 
status were considered as demographic variables. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
used are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log Monthly Wages 26,849 4.998 0.532 1.066 7.851
Categories of Number of Births
0 Child 26,849 0.173 0.378 0 1
1 Child 26,849 0.217 0.413 0 1
More than 2 Children 26,849 0.610 0.488 0 1
Demographic Variables
Age 26,849 35.057 9.178 15 57
Dummy of Marriage 26,849 0.578 0.494 0 1
Human Capital Variables
Education 26,849 1.369 1.338 0 3
9IV. Results
Model 1 is the result of the OLS model. The coffeicients of child dummies mean the 
average wage gap between mothers and non-mothers. Comparing to women without children, 
women with one child receive 9% less monthly wage and women with more than two 
children receive 22.3% less. But this cannot all be attributed to motherhood. There may be a 
third factor or a reversed causality concern. 
To prevent this, model 2, which uses fixed-effects, demonstrates the control of 
individual unobserved heterogeneity. In Model 2, women with one child earn 8.7% less and 
women with two or more children 13.5% less than women without children. It is the volume 
of motherhood wage penalty.
But these differences are not all discrimination. In Model 3, which controls education 
and career, women with one child earn 7.9% less monthly wage and women with two or more 
children are 11.1% less than women without children. For women with two or more children, 
Years of Tenure 26,849 4.116 4.998 0 37
Years of Tenure2 26,849 41.922 101.863 0 1369
Years of Work Experience 26,849 7.362 5.595 0 37
Years of Work Experience2 26,849 85.501 125.777 0 1369
Categories of Working Hours
Dummy of Under 35 Hours 26,849 0.100 0.300 0 1
  Dummy of Between 36 to 52 26,849 0.709 0.454 0 1
  Dummy of Over 53 Hours 26,849 0.186 0.390 0 1
Dummy for Children Under 5 
Years Old
26,849 0.152 0.359 0 1
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model 3 showed a smaller difference than model 2. In addition, after controlling for working 
hours, women with one child earned 6.9% less monthly wages and women with two or more 
children 9.9% less than women without children. Finally, after controlling for the presence of 
children under 5, women with one child earned 6.4% less monthly wages and women with 
two or more children paid 9.6% less than women without children. In summary, there is a 
significant wage difference between mothers and non-mothers (more than 20% for women 
with two or more children).
Table 2. Results of Panel Regression on Log of Monthly Wage
OLS FEM FEM FEM FEM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of Births
1 Child
-0.090***
(0.010)
-0.087***
(0.009)
-0.079***
(0.009)
-0.069***
(0.008)
-0.064***
(0.009)
More than 2 Children
-0.223***
(0.009)
-0.135***
(0.009)
-0.111***
(0.008)
-0.099***
(0.008)
-0.096***
(0.008)
Age
0.004***
(0.000)
0.040***
(0.000)
0.013***
(0.002)
0.020***
(0.002)
0.019***
(0.002)
Dummy of Marriage
0.035***
(0.008)
-0.043***
(0.008)
-0.044***
(0.008)
-0.016*
(0.008)
-0.011
(0.008)
Education
0.008
(0.007)
0.013
(0.007)
0.012
(0.007)
Years of Tenure
0.010***
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
Years of Tenure2
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Years of Work Experience
0.051***
(0.003)
0.040***
(0.003)
0.040***
(0.003)
Years of Work Experience2
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
Dummy of Under 35 Hours
-0.376***
(0.008)
-0.376***
(0.008)
Dummy of Over 53 Hours
0.075***
(0.006)
0.075***
(0.006)
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Dummy for Children Under 
5 Years Old
-0.011
(0.007)
Constant
5.007***
(0.015)
3.717***
(0.017)
4.333***
(0.044)
4.154***
(0.042)
4.156***
(0.042)
N 26849 26849 26849 26849 26849
R-sqaured 0.033 0.288 0.318 0.398 0.398
Note: standard error in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
How does motherhood wage penalty and motherhood wage discrimination differ by 
educational level? Table 3 shows the above analysis divided into three educational groups. It 
shows the coefficients of having a child dummy only. Each model is equivalent to the same 
model in table 2 except that it does not have education at the list of independent variables.
In less than high school education, comparing to women without children, women 
with one child earned 3.6% lower wages, and women with two or more children earned 5.7% 
lower wages. In colleges with two or three years, comparing to women without children, 
wages for women with one child were as low as 9.5%, and comparing to women with more 
than one child, wages were 12.9% lower. In four-year college graduates and above, 
comparing to women without children, wages for women with one child were about 9.1% 
lower, while those with more than one child were 13.6% lower. In summary, wage 
discrimination occurs more often between two and three-year and four-year college graduates 
than high school graduates. 
Table 3. Results of Panel Regression on Log of Monthly Wage by Educational Attainment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
High or 
Under
1 Child
-0.052***
(0.015)
-0.065***
(0.015)
-0.058***
(0.015)
-0.046***
(0.014)
-0.036*
(0.014)
More than 2 
Children
-0.177***
(0.013)
-0.080***
(0.015)
-0.070***
(0.015)
-0.061***
(0.014)
-0.057***
(0.014)
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2, 3 Year 
College
1 Child
-0.128***
(0.018)
-0.133***
(0.019)
-0.104***
(0.018)
-0.087***
(0.017)
-0.095***
(0.019)
More than 2 
Children
-0.188***
(0.015)
-0.216***
(0.017)
-0.148***
(0.017)
-0.124***
(0.016)
-0.129***
(0.017)
4 Year 
College or 
Higher
1 Child
-0.086***
(0.016)
-0.077***
(0.014)
-0.082***
(0.014)
-0.082***
(0.013)
-0.091***
(0.015)
More than 2 
Children
-0.155***
(0.014)
-0.145***
(0.014)
-0.135***
(0.014)
-0.130***
(0.013)
-0.136***
(0.014)
Note: standard error in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In the following, we will look at how different jobs are different in the same education 
level. At this time, we combine 2, 3 year college graduates with 4 year college graduates or 
higher. Table 4 shows the coefficients analyzed according to occupations of women who have 
been educated below high school. In the manager / professional group, comparing to women 
without children, women with one child earned 9.7% lower wages, and women with two or 
more children earned 7.1% lower wages. In semi-professional group, comparing to women 
without children, women with one child earned 10.3% lower wages, and women with two or 
more children earned 19.6% lower wages. In clerical, sales or service worker, comparing to
women without children, women with one child earned 2.4% lower wages, and women with 
two or more children earned 6.2% lower wages. In manual worker, comparing to women 
without children, women with one child earned 1.0% lower wages, and women with two or 
more children earned 3.0% lower wages. In summary, motherhood wage discrimination is the 
largest in the semi-professional group, followed by manager / professional group, clerical, 
sales or service worker, and manual worker.
Table 4. Results of Panel Regression on Log of Monthly Wage by Occupation (High School 
or Less Education)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Manager/
Professional
1 Child
-0.139*
(0.054)
-0.113
(0.064)
-0.101
(0.064)
-0.114
(0.062)
-0.097
(0.065)
More than 2 
Children
-0.05
(0.051)
-0.107
(0.066)
-0.043
(0.069)
-0.070
(0.067)
-0.071
(0.067)
Semi-
Professional
1 Child
0.063
(0.050)
-0.043
(0.055)
-0.076
(0.054)
-0.083
(0.054)
-0.103
(0.054)
More than 2 
Children
-0.023
(0.042)
-0.159**
(0.056)
-0.180**
(0.057)
-0.190***
(0.056)
-0.196***
(0.056)
Clerical, 
Sales or 
Service 
Worker
1 Child
-0.067***
(0.019)
-0.034
(0.020)
-0.026
(0.019)
-0.022
(0.018)
-0.024
(0.019)
More than 2 
Children
-0.162***
(0.016)
-0.086***
(0.019)
-0.063***
(0.019)
-0.061***
(0.017)
-0.062***
(0.018)
Manual 
Worker
1 Child
-0.018
(0.027)
-0.037
(0.030)
-0.043
(0.030)
-0.013
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.027)
More than 2 
Children
-0.178***
(0.024)
-0.017
(0.032)
-0.060
(0.032)
-0.027
(0.030)
-0.030
(0.030)
Note: standard error in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5 shows the coefficients divided by occupation by women who have been 
educated over 2 years college and over 4 years college. In the manager / professional group,
comparing to women without children, women with one child earned 5.8% lower wages, and 
women with two or more children earned 11.0% lower wages. In semi-professional group, 
comparing to women without children, women with one child earned 3.9% lower wages, and 
women with two or more children earned 17.4% lower wages. In clerical, sales or service 
worker, comparing to women without children, women with one child earned 11.5% lower 
wages, and women with two or more children earned 10.4% lower wages. In manual worker, 
discrimination showed the largest coefficient value, but it was not statistically significant in 
the overall model. In the semi-professional group, women with more than college education 
were more discriminated against than those who had been educated below high school. In 
addition, discrimination among women with more than college education was stronger in all 
occupations than women with less than high school education.
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Table 5. Results of Panel Regression on Log of Monthly Wage by Occupation (2 Years 
College and Over 4 Years College)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Manager/
Professional
1 Child
-0.085***
(0.018)
-0.042*
(0.017)
-0.046**
(0.017)
-0.050**
(0.017)
-0.058**
(0.019)
More than 2 
Children
-0.125***
(0.016)
-0.102***
(0.017)
-0.103***
(0.016)
-0.105***
(0.016)
-0.110***
(0.017)
Semi-
Professional
1 Child
-0.074**
(0.029)
-0.066*
(0.028)
-0.036
(0.027)
-0.031
(0.027)
-0.039
(0.029)
More than 2 
Children
-0.142***
(0.024)
-0.228***
(0.027)
-0.181***
(0.028)
-0.168***
(0.027)
-0.174***
(0.029)
Clerical, 
Sales or 
Service 
Worker
1 Child
-0.125***
(0.018)
-0.124***
(0.017)
-0.126***
(0.017)
-0.111***
(0.016)
-0.115***
(0.018)
More than 2 
Children
-0.199***
(0.015)
-0.157***
(0.017)
-0.127***
(0.016)
-0.101***
(0.016)
-0.104***
(0.016)
Manual 
Worker
1 Child
-0.182*
(0.083)
-0.064
(0.093)
-0.008
(0.095)
0.028
(0.093)
0.175
(0.106)
More than 2 
Children
-0.393***
(0.073)
0.109
(0.112)
0.124
(0.111)
0.128
(0.110)
0.234*
(0.115)
Note: standard error in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Ⅴ. Conclusion
This study confirmed that there is a difference in wages due to motherhood within
women in South Korea. It was also confirmed that there is motherhood wage discrimination 
that cannot be explained by productivity differences. This difference and discrimination 
differed according to the level of education. Higher education is more vulnerable. Women in 
the semi-professional occupation group with college degree or higher were the most 
vulnerable. For women, wage discrimination appears to be the highest if they do not grow 
into management professions.
The finding is different in the United States. Choi (2011) found that there is less 
discrimination in the professional and semi-professional groups and more discrimination in 
the manual workers. In contrast, this study found that the discrimination occurs more 
seriously in professional occupations and less in manual workers. Especially among highly 
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educated women who have semi-professional job are suffering from the biggest 
discrimination. 
It implies that being a mother is penalized seriously in the labor market of in South 
Korea. Many women have experienced career interruption for childbearing and rearing. It 
generates negative effects beyond the loss of job experiences. Especially women who have 
college degree but fail to promote managerial jobs or to build their career to professional jobs 
and remain at semi-professional jobs are the most serious victim of motherhood wage 
discrimination.
Note that the accuracy of discrimination studies depends on how well the productivity 
is measured. Insufficient productivity measures may overestimate the volume of 
discrimination. In addition, if this productivity measures include the influence of 
discrimination, there is risk of underestimation of the discrimination.
In this study, it may not be good enough to fully capture the volume of human capital 
by education dummy and two types of job experience. Working hours and having a child 
under age 5 may be incomplete to measure work effort and compensating differentials. If then, 
there is a risk of that the estimated discrimination could be bigger than the actual 
discrimination. The opposite is also possible. If a variable which is expected to capture the 
productivity, but it is also related with the discrimination, the estimated discrimination could 
be smaller than the actual discrimination. For example, if a mother has a part-time job with 
no preference because she is allowed to have only part-time job, the estimated discrimination 
will be smaller than the actual discrimination. In addition, if a mother who has a child under 
age 5 are being discriminated in the labor market more, the last model will fail to capture that 
amount of discrimination.
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We admit that there is a risk of overestimation or underestimation of discrimination at 
this study. But the comparison of models which have productivity measures can tell the 
difficulty of being mother in South Korea. They are suffering from sizable wage gap which 
cannot be explained by productivity differentials. It can be regarded that there is motherhood 
wage discrimination in South Korea. It implies that the difficulty of being mother in the labor 
market still exists or is not much changed even though the gender wage gap is shrinking. To 
fully understand their difficulties, it is needed to see the gender gap as well as motherhood 
gap within women. 
17
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